MoeV Unmasked: An ogregore story

Here’s the second installment of ogregore stories, this one about deception and regulatory capture. It’s another trickster story, just like the first one about Wezl’s Ghosts.

The legend of Moev

In the land of Commerce, MoeV stood mighty and proud. It glittered with confidence, its banners flew high, emblazoned with promises of innovation and profit. But behind the mask of confident ambition, MoeV was troubled. Greed and caution wrestled nightly in its dreams, circled by hosts of silenced strategists, haunted by visions of failure and loss.

Competition was fierce and growing fiercer. Rivals touted their wares, drawing away MoeV’s previously loyal customers. Market, the demanding deity of endless growth, circled angrily, demanding more, cheaper, better. MoeV knew it had to produce something remarkable, something that could silence its critics, inspire confidence, and secure its dominance.

Short on time and squeezed by slender profit margins, MoeV crafted a flawed marvel—beautiful on the outside, yet dangerously defective within. Its conscience muttered warnings, but that voice had long been muted by MoeV’s hubris and greed. “It’ll all be fine,” MoeV reassured itself, short-term need overruling the prudence of earlier days.

And there stood Reg, once the vigilant guardian of public safety, now lulled into drowsiness by decades of friendship and familiarity. MoeV approached its good friend Reg with honeyed words and sleight of hand, obscuring the ugly truth behind carefully constructed illusions. Reg, eyes clouded by confidence and reassured by pride in MoeV’s past achievements, let MoeV place a silken blindfold over its eyes. “I trust you,” Reg murmured, “as I always have.”

Over time, MoeV and its fellows had woven subtle loopholes into Reg’s rules—hidden doors and secret passages through which MoeV now slipped unseen. As MoeV passed Reg’s tests and its products entered the marketplace to great acclaim, it felt relief—and ignored a gnawing dread that the masks and tricks had gone too far this time.

Then disaster struck. The flawed marvel shattered disastrously. At first, MoeV could explain it away as an anomaly, an exception, some peasant’s incompetence. But then the cracks in the mask broke open, and cries of betrayal echoed across the land. Unable to avoid blame, MoeV then turned inward, blaming individual humans within its vast structure, sacrificing a few prominent faces to satisfy public outrage—anything to protect the systemic rot from exposure. MoeV loudly proclaimed its repentance and rebirth. Yet behind the theater, its character remained unchanged, built upon ambition, shortcuts, and trade-offs.

Reg, shaken and ashamed, removed the blindfold at last, but could scarcely remember how to enforce its rules. outrage demanded action, yet Reg’s measures were timid—stern promises of closer scrutiny and fines that seemed big but that barely scratched MoeV’s wealth.

Watching from afar, MoeV’s competitors shifted uneasily—they had all walked similar paths. “There but for the grace of God go I,” each whispered, knowing full well their own narrow escapes from a risk taken too far. They too wore masks and played tricks. They too had danced lightly past Reg’s sleepy gaze. Their luck had simply held—for now.

Not long after the scandal, MoeV stood proud again, outwardly repentant, inwardly unchanged. And Reg, ever unmatched to its task, nodded back into complacency, awaiting the inevitable next seduction.

Takeaways

• Regulatory capture (e.g., delegation and loopholes) allows companies to avoid strict supervision.

• Engineering and commercial priorities can come into conflict.

• The ritual sacrifice of leadership scapegoats doesn’t solve underlying problems.

• Self-preservation and growth can trump the well-being of others.

• Shadows shroud unwelcome truths, preventing them from coming into the open.

• Over-ambition can lead to a fall from grace, but the fall isn’t far, and recovery is swift.

Notes

This story was inspired by the VW diesel emissions scandal and the crashes of Boeing’s 737 MAX. Some of the themes that struck me:

• Both VW and Boeing displayed hubris, believing they could circumvent regulations or engineering limitations. VW believed it could outsmart regulators, and Boeing believed it could engineer its way around pilot training requirements. This led to a culture of overconfidence where warnings were ignored, and risks were downplayed.

• Both organizations prioritized cost reduction and profit maximization over safety and regulatory compliance. 
• VW aimed to expand its US market share by offering “clean diesel” vehicles, seeking to maintain its competitive edge in the diesel market. Organizational targets—tied to bonuses and promotions—emphasized aggressive growth, profitability, and market expansion. 
• Boeing faced intense competition from Airbus's fuel-efficient A320neo and needed to quickly deliver an upgraded 737 to maintain market share and sales momentum. There was intense commercial pressure to avoid costly pilot retraining which would deter sales. Internal incentives emphasized speed, cost control, and shareholder returns.

• Both cases involved systemic failures in risk assessment and mitigation. The organizations failed to anticipate the potential consequences of their actions. Internal controls were inadequate, and warning signs were ignored or suppressed. There were cultures of secrecy that compromised effective decision-making.
• VW had a highly centralized, hierarchical, and top-down culture with limited openness to dissenting voices. Middle managers faced intense pressure to deliver results without clear mechanisms to raise feasibility concerns.
• At Boeing, engineering concerns were subordinated to speed-to-market pressures and cost considerations.

• Both companies influenced the regulatory process: VW by gaming the emissions test, and Boeing by influencing the FAA certification process.

There were differences, of course:

• VW's deception was primarily software-based, involving the deliberate manipulation of emissions testing. Boeing's deception entailed the withholding of information, and the downplaying of risks associated with a new hardware/software system.
• While both scandals had significant consequences, the Boeing 737 MAX crashes resulted in direct loss of life—346 people died in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines disasters—whereas the VW scandal primarily involved environmental and economic damage.
• The Boeing failure was abrupt and highly visible, with crashes occurring in rapid succession. The VW failure was a slow burn, uncovered by testing, and then litigated.

The story doesn’t reflect the role of local versus foreign regulators. In other words: MoeV is subject to various Regs in various places. Its local Reg is much more favorably inclined to it than foreign ones; Moev and LocalReg have been doing each other favors for a long time. 

There were also similarities in the behavior of VW and its peers, and of Boeing and its competitors.

While VW's approach involved deliberate cheating, other manufacturers also employed questionable strategies. Some optimized their emissions control systems for laboratory tests, resulting in significant discrepancies between test results and real-world performance. Others used “thermal windows,” where emissions control systems operated effectively only within a narrow temperature range, effectively disabling them in most real-world driving conditions. 

• Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) faced allegations in Germany and the US that some diesel models emitted higher NOx levels during real-world conditions than during lab tests.
• Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) faced allegations of emissions cheating on Jeep and Ram diesel models. FCA settled with the EPA and DOJ, agreeing to pay penalties and recall vehicles without admitting intentional wrongdoing.
• Investigations revealed significant discrepancies between lab and real-world emissions of Renault, Peugeot, Citroën, Nissan, and others’ vehicles (primarily in Europe).
• European regulators tightened testing procedures, introducing real-driving emissions tests, in response to these industry-wide discrepancies.

Other aircraft manufacturers have also been accused of, or shown to have, exploited regulatory systems, leveraged trust, or taken advantage of loopholes.

• Early in the A330/A340 certification process, there were allegations that Airbus had pushed for and received certain certifications based on assumptions and limited testing, particularly regarding the aircraft's handling in certain failure scenarios. As a major European manufacturer, it has a close relationship with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) which could create situations where regulatory scrutiny might be less stringent
• The Bombardier CSeries (now Airbus A220) program faced delays and cost overruns, putting pressure on Bombardier to expedite certification. There were allegations that Bombardier pushed for certifications based on limited data and assumptions.
• Embraer has been accused of leveraging its relationships with its home regulator in its home Brazil (ANAC) to expedite certification of its regional jets.

This pattern of behavior isn’t limited to the automobile and aviation industries. Other cases that show similar patterns to the story of MoeV and Reg include: 

The Theranos Scandal: Driven by the desire for rapid growth and market dominance, Theranos prioritized hype over scientific validation. The company engaged in fraudulent practices, misrepresenting the capabilities of their technology. There was a conceited belief that it could revolutionize blood testing, despite the absence of the necessary scientific breakthroughs. There was strict secrecy and dissenting voices were silenced. However, this narrative has been dominated by a charismatic and ambitious leader who deceived investors and the public.

The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: BP prioritized cost reduction and schedule acceleration in deepwater drilling, leading to shortcuts and safety violations. It ignored warning signs and prioritized production over safety. Performance bonuses were tied directly to cost-saving and timely project completions, and safety concerns were disregarded or minimized under pressure to deliver projects quickly and cheaply. There was organizational hubris in the belief that it could manage the complexity and dangers of deepwater drilling. After the event, BP downplayed the severity of the spill and attempted to shift blame.

General Motors Ignition Switch Failure: GM recalled more than 800,000 cars and paid compensation for 124 deaths. The fault had been known to it for at least a decade prior to the recall. Cost-reduction targets incentivized engineers and managers to minimize expensive recalls or product redesigns. Bureaucratic silos and hierarchical communication structures suppressed timely escalation of safety concerns. Regulatory oversight was limited by resource constraints, industry trust, and reliance on self-reporting from manufacturers.